I open-sourced `agent-security` today. Coding agents can clone a poisoned starter, read hostile content, leak private context into a public commit, or run a destructive GitHub command. Each action lo
Why CEREBRO kept it
Open-source security framework for coding agents; addresses novel agentic risks
The text below is an automated extraction of the article at https://x.com/nykdotdev/status/2079068942681993237, stored verbatim in the public cerebro-vault repository. Copyright remains with the original publisher (x.com).
Coding agents can clone a poisoned starter, read hostile content, leak private context into a public commit, or run a destructive GitHub command. Each action lo
> Open-source security framework for coding agents; addresses novel agentic risks
I open-sourced `agent-security` today.
Coding agents can clone a poisoned starter, read hostile content, leak private context into a public commit, or run a destructive GitHub command. Each action looks ordinary in isolation. The damage appears when trust crosses a boundary without a gate.
I wanted a small preflight layer I could inspect myself, run offline, and place before the expensive security tooling.
So I built five controls:
1. `scan` checks a repository before publication for credential shapes, private paths, invisible Unicode, and same-file decode-to-exec patterns.
2. `vet` inspe
Backlinks
Appeared in 1 briefing